How NZ could take stand against Pacific countries being used as political footballs

The international rules-based order has come under increasing stress and strain over the last decade and looks likely to continue on the same rocky path for the foreseeable future. In the Pacific, political tensions and competition between powerful states – the United States and its allies, and China – have reached new heights. The increasing risk is that Pacific countries are being used as political footballs. New Zealand could and should have a role in intervening and protecting our Pacific neighbours.

“Indo-Pacific” strategies have proliferated over the last decade, including with Japan, France, Germany, Netherlands, the EU, and the US. Under Aukus, the UK and the US are helping Australia to buy nuclear-powered submarines to support their shared strategic goals in the Indo-Pacific. Individual Pacific countries have entered into more than 60 security agreements with external actors.

Most of these security agreements are with “traditional” partners such as Australia (accounting for over half of the total), New Zealand and the US. However, the security arrangements sought by “non-traditional” partners – in particular China’s security deal with the Solomon Islands, and it seeking a region-wide agreement with 10 Pacific countries – have attracted much more media attention and concern in Western-aligned states.

The recent decision of the Trump administration to freeze US foreign aid provides another reminder of the current instability. The US isn’t the most important donor in the region – Australia stands out as the largest by far, accounting for about 40 percent of official development finance to Pacific countries – but this latest move is bound to create more uncertainty about the policy goals of the US and its allies in the Pacific. It may also be viewed by other external actors as creating something of a vacuum, allowing – or inviting – them to become more engaged in the region.

All this competition carries the danger of turning Pacific countries into political footballs. More worryingly, it raises the threat of increased militarisation of our “ocean of peace”, and even the possibility of war. At the very least it distracts from the most important issues facing the Pacific region, especially climate change.

Pacific countries have clearly expressed what kinds of engagement they seek from external actors in the region. The Pacific Islands Forum’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent sets out the vision of Pacific leaders for the next 25 years, focused on “a resilient Pacific Region of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion and prosperity, that ensures all Pacific peoples can lead free, healthy and productive lives”. It calls for a “whole-of-region approach, the inclusion of all key stakeholders in supporting and delivering on our shared priorities and engaging as the Blue Pacific Continent in strategically beneficial partnerships at the regional, multilateral and global level”.

Consistent with their hopes for a peaceful and non-aligned Pacific, forum leaders have long adopted a posture of “friends to all, enemies to none”. They have expressed dismay at how growing geo-strategic competition in the region has tended to narrow their strategic choices and horizons. In an effort to manage these competing interests, they have promulgated a set of “Blue Pacific Principles for Dialogue and Engagement”, and are considering the introduction of a tiered approach to working with partners, in the context of an overall review of the regional architecture.

What role for New Zealand in all this?

New Zealand’s geographical and genealogical connections to the Pacific and traditionally independent approach to international politics put it in a prime position to play an important leadership role. New Zealand cannot compete with the US, Australia or China in the amount of aid it can offer the Pacific. However, it enjoys a great advantage in the close associations and trust it has already established with Pacific countries, at both intergovernmental and personal levels.

Most immediately, New Zealand could exercise leadership by taking actions that show it is serious about achieving its new Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement – to reduce emissions by 51 to 55 percent compared with 2005 levels, by 2035.

New Zealand should continue to support the review of the forum’s mechanisms for engaging with external actors, proactively support Pacific-led solutions for challenges facing the region and foster deeper collaboration between academic institutions and other civil society organisations throughout the region.

The kind of leadership New Zealand can exercise would not involve it giving directions, talking down to, or patronising other countries in the Pacific. Instead, it would be a kind of leadership that works in solidarity with other Pacific countries, and would support the strategic goals and aspirations of Pacific countries as expressed by the forum leaders.

In other words, it is a kind of leadership that demonstrates in action that New Zealand sees its own future as intimately tied up with that of the Pacific – because it is part of the Pacific.